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1. Since the 1950s, economic growth rates in industrialized
countries have declined. Whereas the per capita growth rate of
gross domestic product in industrial countries was 3.7 in the
fifties and 4.2 in the sixties, the growth rate came down to 3.0
in the seventies and to 2.1 in the eighties (Table 1). This
picture of declining growth rates is even stronger when the
growth rate is not expressed on a per capita basis.
However, we do not observe a uniform picture for the industrial
countries (Figure 1). There is no major decline for the US in
terms of the per capita growth rate. France, Germany, Italy and
Japan reduced the gap in per capita income to the United States,
but they experienced a strong decline of their growth rate
whereas the low rate of the United Kingdom remained rather
stable. A similar picture as in Figure 1 for the Eastern European
countries shows a steep decline in the seventies and the
eighties.
* Symposium "Policies for Long-Run Economic Growth",
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming,
August 27. - 29./ 1992- 2 -
2. I would like to analyze more closely the case of Germany,
where the growth rate of gross domestic product per capita has
come down considerably over the last forty years somewhat picking
up in the late eighties.
A perfect explanation would require a multifactor approach
(Maddison 1987) that analyzes the change in productivity, the
augmentation of factors as well as a set of supplementary
conditions including structural change, the availability of
natural resources, foreign trade and economic policy.
A first approach is to look at the development of factor
productivities. In the German case, both labor and capital
productivity have increased in the fifties, but after 19 60, both
productivities follow a diverging trend.
Labor productivity rises with a lower rate of increase in the
early and late eighties. Capital productivity exhibits a negative
trend in the sixties and seventies reaching 7 2.3 per cent of the
1960 level in 1991. In the eighties, capital productivity remains
constant with some slight improvement in the late eighties. Total
factor productivity exhibits a falling trend (4.8 per cent in the
fifties, 2.4 per cent for 1960 - 73, 0.6 per cent for 1973 - 82
and 1.2 per cent for 1982 - 1991).
Estimates based on the table in the appendix. Own calculations.
Total factor productivity growth calculated as the residual not
explained by labor and capital growth. Weights used are 0.7 for
labor and 0.3 for capital.- 3 -
Table 1. Economic Growth (a) in Industrial Countries,
1950 - 1991 (per cent)
Country 50s 60s 70s 80s(b)















Variation 52.5 40.7 25.0 37.2
(a) Average growth rate of GDP per capita in international
dollars of 1980. - (b) 1980-91. - (c) 1980-90.
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3. The fifties can be characterized as a period in which the
production capacity has continuously increased. Both capital and
labor (measured as persons engaged, i.e. persons employed
including selfemployed persons) are augmented considerably with
the capital stock nearly doubling. In this period of capital
widening, capital and labor are not really moving down their
respective marginal productivity curves. Theses curves shift
outward due to the augmentation of the other factor and due to
technical progress.
In the sixties, the seventies and the early eighties, the work
force remains stable in spite of an active immigration policy in
the sixties. The capital stock nearly tripples in real terms. In
this period of capital deepening, the capital intensity rises,
and capital productivity falls while labor productivity-
increases. Capital is working its way down the falling marginal
productivity curve.
In the late eighties (since 1987), capital productivity starts
rising again. The labor force increases by roughly 3 million
between 1982 and 1991. The capital stock also grows. On a more
moderate scale than in the fifties, capital widening takes place.
4. This analysis leads to a rather simple conclusion: It is
favorable for economic growth when both capital and labor
increase and when capital and labor productivity rise
simultaneously. Unfortunately, in most cases the real world is
more complex in that one factor remains constant and has to be
substituted by another factor. This does not preclude that growth
may take place in the more complex case when only one factor such
as capital is augmented. Increasing only one factor, however,
means moving down the marginal productivity curve unless there is
technological progress.
5. An alternative approach to explain the fifties is that
augmentation of labor went together with a catching up to the
pre-war situation. During the thirties and during the war, the
international division of labor was severely restricted. This
distortion of the German economy implied that there was an- 7 -
unusual growth potential. In addition, part of the capital stock
was destroyed during the war. Thus, catching up explains part of
the West German growth story in the fifties and the sixties
(Heitger 1992, Fischer 1988). A similar argument applies to
France, Italy and Japan.
6. Productivity changes and variations in factor supply are
difficult to distinguish. As a rule, capital accumulation goes
hand in hand with an increase in technology if a more recent
vintage of capital is added to the capital stock (embodiment
effect). In addition, there is learning by doing with accumulated
investment; In the German case, capital formation was associated
with a modernization of the capital stock.
Human capital, built up by education as well as by training on
the job, may be a rather important variable in explaining growth.
Whereas the German university system is deficient in producing an
academic elite as the US system does, it generates a broad group
of educated persons. Moreover, the German vocational system
represents an asset.
In Figure 3, the factor price frontier denoting the maximum
possible real factor prices illustrates some of the points made.
If both factors grow and technology remains constant real factor
rewards and productivities do not change. The economy remains in
point A. Growth simply takes place by increasing inputs
quantitively. With technical progress, for instance when labor
quality improves, the economy moves to a higher factor price
frontier (Movement AB) . The central issue of empirical growth
analysis is to distinguish factor augmentation and productivity
growth.
A third case is factor deepening, for instance a higher capital
intensity implying a fall in the real interest rate and an
increase in the real wage (Movement AC). Again this case may be
linked to an increase in technical knowledge through






7. The two oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80 represent cases of
factor shortening or factor reduction. Marginal productivity
schedules of capital and labor as well as the factor-price-
frontier shift to the left (Movement from A to D in Figure 3).
The existing capital stock is made partially obsolete because it
no longer corresponds to -the new price vector. For both oil
shocks, capital productivity declines, and the increase in labor
productivity is reduced.
For the US, Jorgensen (1988) concludes that the climb in real
energy prices "provides part of the solution of the problem of
disappointing U.S. enonomic growth since 1973". Griliches (1988
p.9) looking at the R & D explanation of a productivity slowdown
sees "the most likely direct causes of these pervasive declines
in the growth rates of productivity" in the oil price hikes.
8. Factor shortening also occurs in the case of environmental
protection. The environment as a third or fourth factor of
production is made more scarce by environmental legislation.
Roughly 1 per cent of gross national product was spent on
environmental protection in Germany and in the industrial nations
since the early 7 0s. Of course, environmental expenditures
constitute factor income, but the new environmental constraint
increased the opportunity costs of traditional production and may
well have reduced the growth rate of traditional GNP. The
increased scarcity of nature as a sink has played a similar role
as the reduced availability of energy, albeit in a more
continuous pattern. Of course, this raises the question how we
measure growth.
.9. The analysis presented so far has an interesting implication
for the transition process of eastern Germany. The metamorphosis
from, a central planning system to a market economy means that a
new price vector governs and that the existing capital stock
oriented towards the old prices becomes largely obsolete. There
is an ample supply of qualified labor, and capital accumulation
is needed to equip the labor supply with machines. With nearly 3
million of the east German labor force of 7 million either- - 10 -
unemployed or in the second labor market or commuting , labor
augmentation can take place by drawing labor to the first labor
market. Thus, labor augmentation and capital widening can occur
simultaneously. The potential gains from participating in the
division of labor with the industrialized countries point to' the
same direction. This should represent a positive scenario for
eastern Germany. In terms of Figure 3, the given factor price
frontier of eastern Germany reflects the obsolete capital stock,
and a movement from A to B is possible.
10. With an export share of 33 per cent of GNP (Japan 15, US 8),
Germany can be expected to have benefitted from the integration
into the world economy after 1945 and into Western Europe.
Openess ,matters in economic growth. Intensifying the
international division of labor acts similarly as technical
progress, it is a factor of economic growth operating perpetually
over time. It is hard to pin this determinant down
2
statistically , but as a policy matter it is worth while to take
into account that a positive environment of free trade
contributes to growth in the world economy as well as in
individual.countries.
11. Another implication of the German story is that attitudes of
people, institutions and economic policy matter. This can be
clearly seen by the difference in economic performance between
West and East Germany. But it is also illustrated by the
experience of West Germany. In the fifties, West German economic
policy was focused on rebuilding the country and integrating more
than 12 million refugees who came before 1950. People were
prepared to put in work effort to improve their personal lot, and
economic policy set the incentives in the appropriate way.
2
For developing countries compare the analysis of Edwards
(1992). Dornbusch (1992) is rather sceptical about these results.
Benefits from trade vary with the size of a country. A large
country is likely to experience smaller distortions in autarky
and consequently benefits less from trade in relative terms.- 11 -
In the fifties, the social market economy protecting the
individual by a social net was slowly developed. In the
seventies, the social net was extended considerably. Equity
issues became more prominent. Internationally, the social market
economy with its social net has been interpreted as a consensus
economy (or the "modele rhenan") in which the efficiency loss due
to social safety is the price to be paid for social stability.
Looking more closely, however, the opportunity costs of the
social net are high, and they affect people negatively who
supposedly are to be protected. Legislation of the seventies
included improved benefits in the case• of unemployment and
retirement for the individual, but protection also crept to
specific sectors and firms. Labor market regulations aiming to
protect the individual worker through lay-off restraints and
social closing plans established new exit conditions without
understanding that implicitly the rules for market entry were
changed. Whereas in the fifties competition as a guiding
principle of the economy was more easily accepted, protection of
the individual became more important in the seventies. In the
period of 1973 to 1983 Germany lost 800 000 jobs whereas in the
same period 18 million jobs were created in the US and 5 million
in Japan. Germany was a prototype of Eurosclerosis.
This argument is in line with an explanation of the slowdown as
the result of institutional hysteresis. Introducing rules to
protect the insiders of the labor market and the existing firms
means that the set of constraints relevant for decision making of
individuals and firms becomes more binding. Restraints become
more powerful by partioning (Siebert 1982). Rent-seeking of
interest groups introduces additional constraints. The economy
loses its efficiency as well as its flexibility to react to real
shocks (Olsen 1982, 1988; Lindbeck 1983). The behavior and
attitudes of individuals change to a less entrepreneurial
pattern. Germany of the seventies is of this type.
12. In the eighties, Germany slowly followed a different line of
policy. Some institutional rules of the labor market were
slightly changed, some restrictions on market entry were reduced.
Institutional competition arising from the Cassis-de-Dijon-- 12 -
verdict of the European Court and from the completion of the
internal market served as a can opener for some West German
regulation. Institutional competition allowed to overcome vested
interests to some extent. One lesson is that from time to time
you have to rattle the institutional boat in order to keep the
economy flexible. Part of the story of the eighties was that
fiscal policy brought down.the budget deficit from 4 per cent of
GNP in 1982 to zero in 1988 - in sharp contrast to the advice
given by some American economists. It is not surprising that the
growth rate of gross domestic product per capita, capital
productivity and employment show a more positive picture in the
late eighties.
13. Besides labor market regulations and institutional conditions
of market entry and exit, taxation and the relative size of
government also have played a role in determining economic
growth. An increased share of government spending seems to be
associated- with lower growth rates once a certain level of the
government share of GNP is surpassed. Taxes disturb allocation,
and as a rule they represent a negative incentive for work
effort, saving and investment (Boskin 1988). There is an optimal
size of government being determined by the benefit of providing
public goods such as infrastructure and by the burden of
taxation. In Germany, the share of tax and social security
revenue in GNP has increased from 29.5 (1950) to 42.2 (1989)
3;
the share of government spending in GNP has risen from 31.1
(1950) to 48.9 (1991). On the whole, the tax burden in European
countries has increased reaching for instance 56.1 in Sweden
(1989).and 46.0 in the Netherlands in contrast to 30.1 in the US
and 30.6 in Japan (Heitger 1992).
The policy issue here is to specify the optimal mix between the
provision of public goods and the tax burden, the optimal
structure of the tax system, i.e. which type of taxes are less
The share of social security contribution in GNP has risen from
8.5 (1950) to 17.1 (1991) per cent.Bibliofhek
4es fnsfitufs fi)r Weltwirfschaf
- 13 -
distortive (e.g. the consumption tax), and the optimal structure
of government, i.e. which governmental level should provide which
public goods and to what extent so-called public goods can be
privatized by appropriate institutional arrangements.
The policy answer is that countries are not only involved in
competition in the commodity market but also in the factor
markets if factors are mobile. Institutional or locational
competition is a beauty contest of the immobile factors for the
mobile factors. The institutional arrangement of the world
economy has to be inducive to strengthen institutional
competition.
1.4. Finally, another suspect that we should look at in a
Schumpeterian tradition (Griliches 1988) or in the interpretation
of new growth theory (Romer 1986) as a candidate for a slower
growth would be a slowdown in the rate of creation of new
knowledge " and its application. The data on total factor
productivity (Table 1) indicate a decline, but they are
questionable. Unfortunately, I have no evidence on the level of R
& D activity, on R & D investment or on the flow of new
knowledge. One may raise the question to what extent the
contestability of markets has changed over time - for instance in
the announcement period of the single market - and to what extent
an impact on new knowledge and its implementation can be traced.
4
With some caution the policy strategy is to increase the
contestability of markets and to promote conditions that
represent an incentive to itensify the search for new technical
knowledge and its implementation.
15. Looking for policy conclusions, a long-run orientation of
economic policy aiming at strengthening the supply side is the
4
Technological leadership does not automatically guarantee
economic leadership. Audretsch (199 2) suggests that the same
industrial organization that generates a large flow of new
technical ideas, i.e. a very competitive environment, may not be
conducive to the manufacturing of new products.- 14 -
right approach for economic growth. Such an approach puts
emphasis on the contestability of markets, on an open economy
being integrated in the international division of labor, on open
markets including labor markets with free access of outsiders and
on incentives to find new technical knowledge. Economic policy
should not generate distortions between sectors of the economy,
and it should not produce distortions over time, i.e.
intertemporal inconsistencies. Economic policy should be steady
stressing institutitonal arrangements, it should be
"Ordnungspolitik" defining the appropriate frame of reference for
private activities, and it should refrain from "Prozesspolitik",
by attempting to influence economic activities ad hoc and
reacting to changes in the policy situation and to popular
demand. Last not least, the government should see its role in
providing public goods taking into account the opportunity costs
that taxes create in the private sector. Growth policy needs a
long breath.- 15 -
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt- 18 -
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